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• Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration into the National Airspace 
System (NAS) Project
– Researching how to overcome technical barriers associated with the operation 
of UAS in civil airspace [above 500ft AGL]
– One emphasis has been on the development of Detect and Avoid (DAA) 
technologies and procedures
• A DAA system would allow UAS to comply with the ‘see and avoid’ 
requirements [14 CFR Part 91] in manned aviation
– The requirements authorize manned pilots to maneuver off their route to avoid 
potential/perceived collision hazards; i.e., maintain well clear
• To be applied to UAS operations, well clear had to be mathematically 
defined
– “DAA well clear” (DWC) was initially defined for en-route operations
• I.e., transitioning through Class E/D/G to Class A; explicitly excluded operations in and 
around airports
– Defined through RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) Phase 1 DAA Minimum 
Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)
– DAA system includes alerting and guidance to help pilot determine when a 
maneuver is necessary
Background
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• Phase 2 of RTCA SC-228’s DAA MOPS expands the scope to include terminal 
area operations (Class C, D, E, and G airports)
– Initial research attempted to apply the Phase 1 DAA well clear definition and 
alerting/guidance requirements to the terminal environment
– The en-route DAA well clear hazard zone = 4000ft lateral, 450ft vertical, and 
35sec modified Tau (approx. time to closest point of approach)
• Incorporated ATC expectations and TCAS II interoperability
• A human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation by these authors had pilots fly a 
Phase 1 UAS into a Class D airport (Sonoma County Airport [KSTS])
– Pilots flew instrument and visual approaches
– In some of the approaches a conflict was scripted to occur between airport 
traffic and the UAS
– Primary research question: 
• How well can pilots maintain appropriate separation against traffic using the Phase 1 
en-route DAA well clear definition?
Background
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• The results demonstrated the poor fit of the Phase 1, en-route DAA well 
clear definition in the terminal area
• The relatively large size of the Phase 1 definition led to an exceedingly high 
number of DAA alerts
– As a result pilots had a hard time judging when a maneuver was truly necessary
– Led to a much higher number of high-severity losses of DAA well clear than had 
been seen in earlier, Phase 1 research
• The DAA Corrective alert level was also shown to be less useful in the 
terminal area
– The Corrective alert is designed to facilitate ATC coordination prior to 
maneuvering to maintain DAA well clear
– ATC did not expect UAS pilots to coordinate with them prior to maneuvering
– Corrective alerts often lasted less than 15sec
Previous Research
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v Purpose: investigate 2 new DAA well clear definitions tailored to the 
terminal environment
– The candidates were based on expected traffic pattern characteristics
– 2 aspects of the Phase 1 DAA well clear definition were identified as needing 
modification to better conform to standard terminal area operations:
1. Reduce the horizontal threshold: 4000ft is too wide & will routinely alert against VFR 
traffic on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern
2. Reduce the modified Tau (modTau) component: 35sec is too conservative & will alert 
too quickly against intruders that are maneuvering near the airport
v Research Questions: 
1. Are there meaningful differences between the 2 candidate definitions?
2. Is the Corrective alert useful with the new definitions?
Current Objective
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• Independent Variables:
1. DAA Well Clear Definition (2 levels; within-subjects): 
• No Tau = terminal area definition does not include modTau in its criteria
• With Tau = terminal area does include modTau
2. Alerting Configuration (2 levels; between-subjects):
• No Corrective = No DAA Corrective alert or guidance, all other alerting/guidance 
remains
• With Corrective = Full Phase 1 MOPS DAA alerting and guidance structure (Class I)
Experimental Design
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DAA Well Clear Parameters No Tau With Tau Phase 1 (En-Route)
Horizontal Threshold 1500ft 1500ft 4000ft
Vertical Threshold 450ft 450ft 450ft
modTau N/A 15sec 35sec
Alerting Criteria
7
Symbol Name Pilot Action Time to Loss of DWC
Aural Alert
Verbiage
4 Warning 
Alert
• Maneuver now to avoid a loss of 
DAA well clear
• Notify ATC as soon as practicable 
after taking action
30 sec “Traffic, ManeuverNow”  x2
3 Corrective 
Alert*
• Coordinate with ATC then maneuver 
to avoid a loss of DAA well clear 45 sec “Traffic, Avoid”
2 Preventive 
Alert
• Intruder nearby in altitude
• Corrective action should not be 
required
45 sec “Traffic, Monitor”
1 Guidance 
Traffic
• Traffic is generating guidance bands 
outside of current course X N/A
0 Remaining 
Traffic • Traffic within sensor range X N/A
*Corrective alert only present in the With Corrective alerting configuration
• Ground control station (GCS) contained:
1. Viewer Tool – contains approach plate & airport facility directory (AFD)
2. Tactical Situation Display (TSD) – DAA information and vehicle control interfaces 
3. Right Panel – landing checklist and additional info
4. Voice communication panel – touchscreen, transmit/receive on select freqs.
Test Setup
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2 31
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Vigilant Spirit Control Station (AFRL)
• Class D
• Runway 14/32
– Length = 6000ft x 150ft
– RNAV (GPS)
• Elevation = 129ft
• Traffic Pattern = 1150ft
• Downwind lateral offsets:
– Left = 1.5nm (~9000ft)
– Right = 0.5nm (~3000ft)
• Runway 20/02
– Not used
Sonoma County Airport (KSTS)
9
Traffic Pattern Altitude = 1150ft
3NM  (WP1) to RW14 (WP2) = 3nm
RW14 (WP2) to RW32 (WP3)  = 1nm
• Pseudo-pilots monitored and managed all manned traffic (IFR & VFR)
– Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS) software suite
• Air Traffic Control managed UAS and manned traffic
– Tower controller managing Santa Rosa (KSTS)
– Center controller managing Oakland Center (ZOA 40/41)
– Sector traffic modeled using real sector activity and data
• All participants communicated via push-to-talk headsets
– KSTS Tower frequency: 118.50
– Oakland Center frequency: 127.80
– KSTS ATIS: 120.55
Simulation Components
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• Participants flew 2 types of approaches under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
– Instrument (RNAV GPS) Approach
– “Visual” Approach
• Operated a simulated MQ-9 (Reaper; Group 5)
– 65ft wingspan
– 110kts cruise speed
– 1000 FPM climb/descent rate
– 3°/sec turn rate
Scenarios
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Scenarios
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Instrument Approach Notes:
• Final approach coarse offset 15°
• Missed approach procedures = climb to 
5000ft, fly runway heading (143°)
“Visual” Approach Notes:
• Airport “in sight” 10-12nm from runway
• Line up for 3nm final stabilized approach
• Traffic pattern @ 1150ft
• Go-around = climb to 1150/2000ft
• Encounter Type
– Turn Into = traffic blunders into us on final and is intended to lead to NMAC 
without UAS pilot response
– Turn In Front = traffic turns in front of UAS with sufficient separation (~1.5-
2nm) to land safely (turn is coordinated w/ Tower)
– Unscripted = no encounter is scripted to occur but traffic expected to be on 
downwind as UAS is on final
• Pilots flew 4 approaches per trial
– 1 Turn Into & 1 Turn In Front per trial
– All other traffic considered Unscripted
Scenarios
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• Participants
– 16 UAS pilot participants (avg. age = 33 years)
• All IFR rated with manned & unmanned flying experience
– Manned experience = avg. 1000 civilian flight hours, 1600 military flight hours
– Unmanned experience = avg. 500 civilian flight hours, 700 military flight hours
– 2 retired tower controls served as tower controller confederates
Participants
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RESULTS
ALERTING PERFORMANCE…
LOSSES OF DAA WELL CLEAR…
MANEUVER PREFERENCES…
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• The With Tau candidate alerted more frequently to all alert types
– Biggest difference was against Corrective alerts
• Driven by how often Unscripted traffic triggered an alert
– The 2 definitions alerted (nearly) identically against the scripted encounter 
types (Turn Into & Turn In Front)
DAA Alerting Performance
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• Corrective alerts were 
particularly short in the With Tau 
DAA well clear definition
– Frequently only lasted the 
minimum duration (4 seconds)
– Not enough time to coordinate
with ATC
• Warning alerts tended to last 
longer in both DAA well clear 
definitions
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• Proportion of losses of DAA Well Clear (LoDWC) =
– # of LoDWC / # aircraft that generated a DAA Corrective or Warning
• Pilots were twice as likely to lose DAA well clear against the Turn 
Into encounter in the With Tau condition
– Larger hazard zone made it harder for pilots to avoid separation 
violation
Losses of DAA Well Clear
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• With Tau condition resulted in more losses of DAA well clear that were 
effectively unavoidable:
• Product of the larger size of its hazard zone
Losses of DAA Well Clear
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Time to Loss of DAA Well Clear No Tau With Tau 
Less than 15 sec 1/8 (13%) 8/15 (53%)
Less than 5 sec 0 5/15 (33%)
• The two DAA well clear definitions resulted in very similar types of 
maneuvers
– Exception being a larger number of speed decreases against Unscripted 
encounters in the With Tau condition 
– Speed changes not considered disruptive
Initial Maneuver Types
20
11 11
7
0 0
18
2
6
1
16
3
13 12
6
2
0
17
0
1 1
29
3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Heading
Change
Missed
Approach
Speed
Decrease
Temporary
Climb
Heading
Change
Missed
Approach
Speed
Decrease
Temporary
Climb
Heading
Change
Missed
Approach
Speed
Decrease
Temporary
Climb
Turn Into Turn In Front Unscr ipted
Co
un
t
Maneuver Type x Encounter Type
No Tau
DWC Candidate
With Tau
• Pilots made the greatest number of maneuvers when the With Corrective 
alerting condition was paired with the With Tau DAA well clear definition
– Increased ~30% relative to the other 3 conditions
Number of Maneuvers Made
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• With Tau candidate led to more:
– DAA alerts against Unscripted encounters
– Short-duration Corrective alerts
– Unavoidable losses of DAA well clear against the Turn Into encounter
– Maneuvers against Unscripted traffic (although it was typically non-disruptive)
• No Tau candidate determined to be a better fit, however:
– Losing DAA well clear against the No Tau definition should be considered a 
more severe/hazardous loss of separation
• Corrective alert level continued to show limited utility
– Short duration Corrective alerts with both candidates, particularly With Tau
• Future work needed to investigate when to switch from the Phase 1/en-
route definition to the terminal area definition
Conclusions
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QUESTIONS?
CONRAD.RORIE@NASA.GOV
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BACKUP
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DAA Alerting & Guidance
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• Generic MQ-9 Reaper
– Speed:
• Cruise: 110 knots
• Landing: 90-110 knots
• Max: 200 knots
• Min: 70 knots
– Climb/Descent Rate: 
• 1000ft/min (default)
• Captures 3° glide slope on final
– Turn Performance:
• Max Roll: +/- 20°
• Turn Rate: 5°/sec
Aircraft Flight Model
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• Pilots trained first on the ground control station followed by training on the 
DAA system
– Trained on the meaning of each alert/guidance type in their given configuration
– Practice en-route scenario flown with conflicts & ATC in-the-loop
• Pilots trained last on how to fly the given approach
– 2 practice approaches flown, one with a scripted conflict
• Informed that a DAA system has been specifically developed to support 
terminal operations 
– Told the hazard zone was 1500ft x 450ft (did not explain tau component)
v Told to use the DAA system to maintain DAA well clear from traffic in the 
terminal environment (i.e., expected to utilize the alerts/guidance)
Training on DAA System
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